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PRIVATE AFFAIRS: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND 
THE RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY 
 
SUSAN A. JACOBSEN* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, the federal circuit courts split on whether public employers can 
discipline their employees for legal, off-duty sexual activity. The Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits permit discipline in these scenarios; the Ninth Circuit does not. At issue is 
whether certain public employees, like police officers, should be held to a higher 
standard because of their duty to the public or whether the Constitution entitles them 
to privacy rights that shield them from discipline. This Note concludes the latter and 
argues against punishing the legal, off-duty sexual conduct of all public employees. 
Because the right to sexual privacy already exists within the penumbras of the 
Constitution, public employees should be protected in their legal sexual conduct. 
While several states still criminalize adultery and thereby make certain off-duty sexual 
activity illegal, this Note also argues that anti-adultery statutes are unconstitutional in 
the same way the Supreme Court found anti-sodomy statutes unconstitutional in 
Lawrence v. Texas. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court should extend its 
logic from Lawrence and find that public employees cannot be disciplined for their 
legal, off-duty sexual activity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the 
community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an 
undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; 
their person or station, from having matters which they may properly prefer 
to keep private, made public against their will.1 
When does the community have a “legitimate concern” into the private affairs of 
its citizens? What if those citizens are public employees? In the United States, most 
public employers recognize that an employee's criminal activity on the job is cause for 
termination.2 However, when the public employee's actions are “neither criminal nor 
on the job, but rather . . . viewed as ‘immoral’ or ‘deviant,’ the salience of termination 
is far more tenuous.”3 Nevertheless, “[m]any public employees have been dismissed 
for some alleged form of harm to the public resulting from purely legal actions away 
from work.”4 This Note focuses specifically on public employees, who have greater 
protections than private-sector employees and thus a greater expectation of privacy.5 
 
1 Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214–15 
(1890). 
2 See Nonnie L. Shivers, Firing “Immoral” Public Employees: If Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Protects Employee Privacy Rights, Then Why Can't We?, 21 
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 621, 622 (2004). 
3 Id. at 622, 624 (Comparing the laws in the United States to those of the European Union 
and ultimately positing that “it is unlikely the United States will impart additional privacy 
protections to public employees.”). 
4 Id. at 622. Examples of public employees fired for otherwise legal actions occurring while 
the employees were off-the-clock include “an elementary school teacher [who] was fired for 
being unmarried and pregnant . . . A librarian employed at a municipal library [who] was also 
terminated for becoming pregnant out of wedlock . . . A male police officer who provided a ride 
home to an underage girl [who] was summarily dismissed due to the appearance of impropriety 
. . . [and] Female and male police officers who engaged in extramarital affairs or merely lived 
with another person out of wedlock [who] have also been dismissed from their roles as public 
servants.” Id.  
5 See Paul F. Gerhart, Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 175, 
176 (1995) (“[P]ublic sector employees enjoy greater explicit protection of their privacy rights 
than private sector employees do.”). Because the actions a government agency takes against its 
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Private and public employment law operate in distinct legal spheres; while private 
employers have significant discretion over the terms and conditions of employment, 
public employers are government actors constrained by the Constitution in their 
employment decisions.6 In the United States, the default rule for private employment 
is employment at-will.7 Except under limited, specific exceptions, either party in an 
at-will employment relationship may terminate employment for any reason or no 
reason at all.8 
Public employees, however, receive certain constitutional protections.9 One 
example is the Supreme Court’s holding that “The First Amendment limits the ability 
of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally 
or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.”10 
Furthermore, since the 1950s, the Supreme Court has applied procedural due process 
protections to public employment and benefits.11 These due process protections create 
additional procedural requirements public employers must follow when they seek to 
dismiss or discipline public employees.12 
 
employees are considered “state action,” public-sector employees are able to invoke 
constitutional rights in ways that private-sector employees are not. See Elizabeth Wilborn, 
Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. 
REV. 825, 828 (1998). 
6 See Pauline Kim, Market Norms and Constitutional Values in the Government Workplace, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 601, 610 (2016) (“Although accommodations are made for the government's 
interests as employer, constitutional rights provide the relevant background against which 
individual disputes are decided.”). 
7 See William Homer, Just Cause for Trust: Honoring the Expectation of Loyalty in the At 
Will Employment Relationship, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 833, 836 (2018). 
8 Id. (“The common articulation of the doctrine is that an at-will employee can be terminated 
‘for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.’”). 
9 See James F. Allmendinger et al., The First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment Constitutional 
Rights of Public Employees–Free Speech, Due Process and Other Issues, AM. BAR ASS'N 1 
(2009) (“The First Amendment protects the right to free speech and free association. The Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment 
provides protections against compelled self-incrimination, and against denials of due process in 
connection with discipline and discharge. As is well-settled, such protections are enforceable 
against state and local governments by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
10 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 
597 (1972)). 
11 See Corinne D. Kruft, McDaniels v. Flick: Terminating the Employment of Tenured 
Professors – What Process is Due?, 41 VILL. L. REV. 607, 611–12 (1996) (“The Constitution 
affords due process protection of property through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Historically, property rights did not include the right to public employment. In the 1950s, 
however, the Supreme Court began to actively apply procedural due process protections to 
public employment and benefits. The Supreme Court's first substantial development in this area 
came in the twin cases of Board of Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann.”). 
12 See Tommy Tobin, Far From a “Dead Letter”: The Contract Clause and North Carolina 
Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1681, 1711 (2018) (“The creation of the 
property interest in continued public employment triggers constitutional due process 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
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However, there are limits to these constitutional protections.13 Public employees’ 
protections are not unfettered and must remain within the confines of the constitutional 
framework. For example, in Doggrell v. City of Anniston, an Alabama city terminated 
Josh Doggrell, a police officer, after he spoke at a League of the South national 
conference.14 The Court ultimately upheld Doggrell’s termination, finding that it did 
not violate his First Amendment interest because his “interest in speaking out was 
outweighed by the [A]PD's interests in maintaining order, loyalty, morale, and 
harmony [within the APD and throughout the community].”15 In this case, the police 
officer publicly espoused inflammatory opinions and remarks that endangered the 
safety of the community in which he was employed. What about cases in which police 
officers privately engage in off-duty behavior that presents no harm to the community? 
The cases that follow examine this question in detail.  
The U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal are currently split on the issue of whether public 
employees (in these cases, law enforcement officers) can be disciplined for their legal, 
off-duty sexual conduct. On the one hand, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held that 
public employees can be disciplined for this behavior, reasoning that these employees 
are held to a higher standard because of their duty to the public.16 Conversely, the 
Ninth Circuit has held that public employees cannot be disciplined for legal, off-duty 
sexual conduct because the employees have a fundamental right to privacy and 
intimate association.17  
The circuits split on where to draw the line. If it is appropriate to punish law 
enforcement officers—as public employees held to a higher standard—for legal, off-
 
protections. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, due process is owed when 
governments deprive citizens of property. Protected public employees have three distinct due 
process requirements: (a) notice to the employee, (b) an opportunity for the employee to 
respond, and (c) a final decision by an impartial decision maker.”). 
13 In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court notes that the law must “arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
568 (1968). 
14 See Doggrell v. City of Anniston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1244–1252 (N.D. Ala. 2017). The 
video of Doggrell’s speech was posted to YouTube and had “a tremendous impact on the 
community.” The police chief believed that the backlash to Doggrell’s remarks resulted in real 
safety concerns to the community, and Doggrell conceded there was some potential for race 
riots. On their website and social media pages, the League of the South has “promot[ed] a return 
to segregation, overtly disparage[ed] black Americans, promot[ed] white supremacy and the 
inferiority of black Americans (in the context of a threatened race war), and espous[ed] plainly 
racist and inflammatory rhetoric. Id. at 1248. Note that the Southern Poverty Law Center has 
designated the League of the South as an “hate group” due to the organization’s extremist views 
and racist and violent behavior. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/league-south. 
15 Id. at 1259 (citing Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1294 (2000)). 
16 See generally Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2017); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin 
City, 528 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008). 
17 Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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duty sexual conduct, other public employees must be held to the same standard. Public 
school teachers, especially, have been routinely disciplined and terminated for their 
behavior during off-hours.18 However, given that city planners, prosecutors, and 
politicians, for example, are just some of the many other types of public employees, it 
becomes clear that a uniform standard would have sweeping effects. As it currently 
stands, public employees and employers dealing with cases involving sexual privacy 
“may experience some luck of the draw, depending on where they find themselves 
litigating.”19  
If public employees can be sanctioned for their private, legal, and off-duty sexual 
conduct, the rules must be enforced equally, consistently, and evenly for all types of 
public employees of both genders. However, given not only the extraordinary 
invasiveness of such a policy, but also, and more importantly, its potential 
unconstitutionality, this Note argues against punishing private, legal sexual conduct at 
all. Although the argument presented in this Note applies to all public employees 
engaged in legal, off-duty sexual conduct, the Note—for the sake of brevity—focuses 
on cases involving law enforcement officers as the employees, and sexual conduct that 
may generally be categorized as adultery.  
Adultery was once a crime in almost all American jurisdictions.20 However, 
recognizing that statutes criminalizing adultery are outdated, many states have 
repealed these laws.21 As of February 2020, only eighteen states still have laws 
 
18 While the author was unable to find exact numbers, research shows there is no shortage of 
cases and news articles surrounding this subject; for example, teachers have been fired for 
expressing their personal views on their private social media pages, for posting or being tagged 
in pictures on social media that depict them engaging in behavior such as drinking an alcoholic 
beverage while on vacation, posing with a male stripper at a bridal shower, and looking down 
the sight of a rifle, and for lawful work they did before becoming teachers such as working as a 
porn actors/actresses. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Teachers Under a Morality Microscope, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/opinion/la-oe-turley-teachers-
under-scrutiny-20120402.  
19 See David W. Garland & Amy B. Messigian, The Circuit Split on Public Employer's Right 
to Discipline for Off-Duty Conduct, 2018 EMERGING ISSUES 8651 (2018) (Furthermore, “[i]t 
may require another trip to the Supreme Court to answer this question definitively.”). The issues 
surrounding the circuit split are identified in this brief article but not thoroughly analyzed. 
20 Katherine Annuschat, An Affair to Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the 
Military, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2010) (“Adultery has been a crime in most 
American jurisdictions since the colonial period, with sanctions ranging from death to a fine.”). 
21 In July of 2018, the governor of Massachusetts, republican Charlie Baker, signed a law 
repealing “antiquated and inappropriate” state laws that included laws punishing “adultery and 
fornication” as well as contraception and abortion restrictions. Jamie Halper, Massachusetts 
Repeals Long-Dormant Ban on Abortion, BOSTON GLOBE (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/07/27/abortion/u49aF1xtj6ywJ8p48DdWGJ/story.h
tml. 
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criminalizing adultery.22 In the states where anti-adultery statutes still exist, these laws 
are rarely enforced.23  
This Note argues that private employees are entitled to privacy for sexual conduct 
between consenting adults occurring during off-duty hours; therefore, public 
employers cannot sanction employees based on this behavior. The most compelling 
evidence in favor of finding a right to sexual privacy for public employees is that it 
already exists within the penumbra of the Constitution.24 Because the constitutional 
right to sexual privacy already exists,25 public employees are therefore protected in 
their legal sexual conduct.  
In states that still criminalize adultery, the argument requires an additional step of 
analyzing the constitutionality of anti-adultery laws. Using the same logic that created 
the right to privacy, this Note also argues that anti-adultery statutes are 
unconstitutional in the same way that the Supreme Court found anti-sodomy statutes 
unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.26 The second step, however, is only applicable 
in a subset of cases. In the eighteen states that still criminalize adultery, both 
arguments this Note sets forth are necessary. However, in cases taking place in the 
 
22 See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2017); FLA. STAT. 
§ 798.01 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19 (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-6601 (2018); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/11-35 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-501 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 750.30 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2017); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 255.17 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (2017); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2018); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
15-60 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2018). Sonu Bedi, An 
Illiberal Union, 26 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1081, 1136 (2018). 
23 Deborah Rhode, Why Is Adultery Still a Crime?, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rhode-decriminalize-adultery-20160429-
story.html. In fact, when a Wisconsin woman was charged with adultery in 1990, no one could 
remember the last time the state had attempted to enforce the anti-adultery law, and the case 
garnered such national attention that it made the front page of the New York Times. See William 
E. Schmidt, Adultery as a Crime: Old Laws Dusted Off in a Wisconsin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 1990, at A1. 
24 “The text of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for an individual right to 
privacy; however[,] case law has acknowledged ‘specific guarantees’ of a zone of privacy in 
the Bill of Rights under the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has found the right to privacy to be fundamental, and hence, subject 
to heightened scrutiny, although the Court has not definitively prescribed the bounds of this 
zone of privacy. Over the past four decades, the judiciary has struggled to determine what is 
entitled to privacy protection; no area of debate has been so central to overarching privacy 
doctrine as the right to sexual privacy.” Kristin Fasullo, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a 
Fundamental Right to Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 2998–99 (2009). The author 
of this article specifically posits that taken together, the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
identify “a fundamental right to sexual privacy that limits the state’s ability to regulate the sale 
of sexual devices.” Id. at 3000. 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
26 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
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thirty-two states that do not criminalize adultery, the analysis necessarily ends after 
the first step in the argument.  
Both steps in the argument are rooted in the rationale the Supreme Court used 
in Lawrence v. Texas. In Lawrence, the Court examined the issue of private citizens 
against whom criminal charges were brought based on anti-sodomy statutes. The cases 
involved in the current circuit split involve public employees sanctioned by their 
employers for legal sexual conduct, though there were no criminal charges in any of 
these cases.  
Part II examines the background of the idea of sexual privacy and the evolution of 
case law surrounding the right to privacy, as well as the history of anti-adultery statutes 
and their enforcement. Part II also introduces the background and reasoning of the 
courts in the cases involved in the current circuit split as to whether public employees 
may be disciplined for legal, off-duty sexual conduct.  
Part III argues that a right to sexual privacy exists within the Constitution, and that 
all remaining anti-adultery statutes are unconstitutional; therefore, private employees 
are entitled to sexual privacy in cases of legal sexual conduct between consenting 
adults occurring during off-duty hours, and any sanctions for such behavior are 
unconstitutional. Because a right to sexual privacy exists, public employees cannot be 
punished for legal, off-duty sexual conduct occurring between consenting adults 
because such discipline violates the First Amendment as well as the Due Process 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 During off-duty hours, public employees 
are entitled to the same privacy as private citizens.  
Finally, Part IV builds on the right to sexual privacy and explains why anti-adultery 
statutes are unconstitutional and should be repealed. Ultimately, Part IV concludes by 
arguing that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split by definitively stating 
that a right to sexual privacy exists for all public employees. 
II. THE HISTORY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS AND ANTI-ADULTERY STATUTES 
A. The Evolution of the “Right to Privacy” 
Privacy is a constitutional right. In 1965, the Supreme Court first acknowledged 
this right within the penumbra of the First Amendment of the Constitution in Griswold 
v. Connecticut.28 In Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that 
criminalized the use of contraceptives.29 In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
emphasized the right of privacy granted to married persons specifically and declared 
 
27 Going forward, all references to sexual conduct should be assumed to refer specifically to 
legal sexual activity between consenting adults. Perhaps the biggest example and most 
prominent in the discussed case law is in regard to extra-marital affairs, i.e. adultery. While 
some may consider this behavior to be morally wrong, this article argues that it is not legally 
wrong and, as such, should not be punishable by government employers. 
28 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“In other words, the First Amendment has a penumbra where 
privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”). 
29 Id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions 
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). 
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the government had no place in the “marital bedroom.”30 Seven years after Griswold, 
in 1972, the Court extended this right to unmarried individuals under the Equal 
Protection Doctrine, stating, “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.”31  
The following year, in 1973, the Supreme Court ruled on the landmark case Roe v. 
Wade.32 In Roe, the Court famously held that women have a constitutional right of 
personal privacy that includes the choice to have an abortion.33 This right was 
reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.34 In spite of the developments expanding 
the right to privacy, in 1977, the Supreme Court observed that it “has not definitively 
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits 
state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults.”35  
Then, in 1986, in an opinion that failed to understand the issue within the broader 
context of human relationships and personal autonomy, the Court took a step 
backwards and declined to extend the right to privacy to homosexuals engaging in 
consensual intercourse in Bowers v. Hardwick.36 However, nearly twenty years later, 
Bowers was overturned by Lawrence v. Texas, when the Court finally struck down 
antiquated same-sex anti-sodomy laws.37 While the Court did not expressly state that 
individuals have a fundamental right to sexual privacy, the Court’s holding and 
rationale more than hint at such an implication.38 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
 
30 See generally id. at 479.  
31 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972) (holding that “if under Griswold the 
distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to 
unmarried persons would be equally impermissible” because it would be inconsistent with the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
33 Id. at 154. The Court also noted “this right [was] not unqualified.” 
34 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming Roe’s essential three-part holding). 
35 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977). 
36 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (holding the Due Process Clause did not confer any fundamental 
right on homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sex, even if the conduct occurred in the 
privacy of their own homes). Hardwick was interrupted during private consensual sex by a 
police officer who entered his bedroom and placed him under arrest. See Art Harris, The 
Unintended Battle of Michael Hardwick: After His Georgia Sodomy Case, A Right-to-Privacy 
Crusader, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1986, at C1. 
37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).  
38 Id. (6-3 decision) (holding that Bowers was not correct when it was decided and was now 
overruled, and that the Texas anti-sodomy statute “furthers no legitimate state interest which 
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”). See also Amanda 
Connor, Is Your Bedroom a Private Place - Fornication and Fundamental Rights, 39 N.M. L. 
REV. 507, 521 (2009) (stating, “while Lawrence did not recognize a fundamental right to 
homosexual sex, the reasoning of Lawrence leads to the conclusion that there is a fundamental 
right to consensual heterosexual sex.”). 
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struck down Texas’s consensual sodomy statute as unconstitutional, noting that the 
case involved “two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged 
in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,” and that “the petitioners are 
entitled to respect for their private lives.”39 This holding was grounded in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 The Lawrence decision struck down 
all anti-sodomy statutes in the United States.41  
Lawrence focused on a statute that criminalized same-sex sexual conduct between 
consenting adults who were private citizens.42 The holding in Lawrence arguably has 
a broad application to issues of sexual privacy generally. However, concerning public 
employees specifically, courts are split on whether public employees can be 
sanctioned for their legal sexual conduct occurring during off-duty hours. 
B. Criminalizing Infidelity: A History of Anti-Adultery Statutes 
The concept of adultery (as well as marriage) is a relatively new social construct 
compared to the length of time that individuals have engaged in recreational sexual 
intercourse, be it inside or outside the confines of marriage.43  
In any event, anti-adultery statutes stem from Puritan ideologies concerning 
morality and chastity.44 One of the theories for punishing adultery was to prevent 
vigilante justice; that is, “to preempt violent acts of vengeance by providing an 
alternative way to right the wrong against the husband.”45 This view considered 
adultery “a private wrong that invaded a husband's rights over his wife and not as a 
wrong against society.”46 The Puritans, however, viewed adultery “almost entirely as 
 
39 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
40 Id. at 525–26 (holding the petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.”) In her 
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor bases her finding on the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
41 Id. at 525–26. 
42 Id. at 562. (“The question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a 
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct.”). 
43 See Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre-and Extramarital 
Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1660 (1991) (“Sex is undoubtedly the world's oldest recreational 
activity.”). 
44 See Alyssa Miller, Punishing Passion: A Comparative Analysis of Adultery Laws in the 
United States of America and Taiwan and Their Effects on Women, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 425, 
428 (2010). 
45 See Annuschat, supra note 20, at 1166.  
46 Id. Furthermore, “[s]ince women were viewed as the property of their husbands, these 
cases were often tried as matters of theft or trespass to chattel.” See Jonathan Turley, Of Lust 
and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020
820 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [68:811 
an offense against morality and chastity and far less as a wrong against the husband.”47 
These Puritan ideologies later found their way in to American jurisprudence, and most 
states enacted statutes making adultery a crime.48 
Adultery statutes are also firmly rooted in property law; a common law case from 
1707 opined that because a wife is the property of her husband, “adultery is the highest 
invasion of property.”49 Using that rationale, the court held that an admission of 
adultery was sufficient provocation to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter.50 
The Ohio Supreme Court overturned this precedent in 1992, holding that words alone 
are not enough to constitute reasonably sufficient provocation to justify the use of 
deadly force.51 The Court noted that “this archaic rule [of adultery being considered 
an invasion of property] has no place in modern society.”52 
It should also be noted that women are punished at higher rates than men for 
adulterous behavior and face greater social harms and repercussions than men for the 
same behavior.53 This phenomenon is illustrated in one of the cases involved in the 
circuit split, Perez v. City of Roseville.54 In this case, Perez—a rookie female officer—
had an affair with a veteran male officer.55 Perez was terminated; the male officer was 
not.56 
Many states have now repealed their anti-adultery statutes. In the states that still 
have these statutes on the books, enforcement is a rarity.57 While many may consider 
adultery morally wrong, there is an important distinction between a moral wrong and 
a legal wrong. Moral wrongs are not always legal wrongs, and sometimes fall outside 
the scope of the law and legal punishment. As Oscar Wilde wrote, “Morality is simply 
 
47 See Jeremy D. Weinstein, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 
225–26 (1986). 
48 Id. at 226. In Colonial America, the crime of adultery carried severe punishment. There 
are three recorded cases of execution, while other offenders were subjected to shaming 
punishments such as being branded with an “A” on their foreheads, and “[w]omen were 
routinely stripped to the waist and publicly whipped.” See Turley, supra note 46. 
49 Regina v. Mawgridge (1707), Kelyng, J. 119, 137, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1115.  
50 Id. 
51 State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1992). 
52 Id. 
53 See United Nations Working Group on the Issue of Discrimination Against Women in Law 
and in Practice, Policy Paper: Adultery as a Criminal Offense Violates Women’s Human Rights 
1 (Oct. 2012) [hereinafter United Nations Working Group] (stating “closer analysis reveals that 
the criminalization of adultery is both in concept and practice overwhelmingly directed against 
women and girls.”) See generally Miller, supra note 44, at 432.  
54 882 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2018). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 848–49. 
57 See Annuschat, supra note 20, at 1168.  
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the attitude we adopt towards people whom we personally dislike.”58 Furthermore, “if 
truth were everywhere to be shown, a scarlet letter would blaze forth on many a bosom 
. . . .”59 The subject of adultery is highly contentious and admittedly unlikely to garner 
much sympathy, in spite of the public’s apparent proclivity towards this behavior.60 
Nevertheless, adultery is a moral wrong and a private act that should fall outside the 
scope of the law.  
Of course, in some cases, immoral behavior is also illegal behavior. For example, 
in Priester v. Bd. of Appeals, Priester, a fire captain, was terminated after he sexually 
harassed female subordinates and created a hostile work environment.61 The Board of 
Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System also denied Priester’s application for 
retirement benefits because they determined that he had not rendered “honorable and 
faithful service as an employee.”62 Both the Maryland trial court and appellate court 
upheld the Board’s decision.63 In this case, Priester’s termination and denial of 
retirement benefits was entirely appropriate since his behavior was not only immoral, 
but also illegal. His actions took place in the course of his employment and negatively 
affected other employees.64  
However, had Priester engaged in private, off-duty behavior such as adultery, his 
termination and denial of benefits would not have been appropriate. The Maryland 
Appellate Court even noted this in their opinion, stating,  
it is very clear that ‘fleeting or insignificant’ misconduct cannot amount to 
dishonorable or unfaithful service. [A] single act of unlawfully exceeding the 
speed limit or a discreetly executed act of adultery (with its maximum $10 
 
58 OSCAR WILDE, AN IDEAL HUSBAND (1895).  
59 NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 88 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1919) (1850). 
60 See Zoë Heller, In Defense of Adulterers, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2017, at 101 (“While 
we’ve become considerably more relaxed about premarital sex, gay sex, and interracial sex, our 
disapproval of extramarital sex has been largely unaffected by our growing propensity to engage 
in it. We are eating forbidden apples more hungrily than ever, but we slap ourselves with every 
bite.”). Jonathan Turley, a Washington Post reporter, finds the prosecution of anti-adultery 
statutes “baffling” given that one “could throw a stick on any corner and probably hit a couple 
of adulterers.” Turley pointed to an old study from 1953 by Alfred Kinsey finding “50 percent 
of married men and 26 percent of married women had engaged in adultery by age 40.” A more 
recent study from Ball State University found that women have since closed that gap. See 
Turley, supra note 46, at B1. 
61 Priester v. Bd. of Appeals, 165 A.3d 644, 646 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 646, 655 (holding that 1.) the undefined term “honorable and faithful” service, was 
not so impermissibly vague that it must be struck down, 2.) the term "honorable and faithful" 
service was not applied by the Board in an arbitrary and capricious manner inconsistent with 
the County pension statute and the relevant case law, 3.) the Board's decision, which revoked 
and forfeited Mr. Priester's entire County pension, was not inconsistent with the plain and 
unambiguous language of the pension statute and pension case law, and, 4.) the Board's decision 
was supported by substantial evidence in the record and should not be reversed.). 
64 Id. at 646. 
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fine) could not reasonably abrogate the accrued benefits of 20 years of 
faithful employment.65  
Despite the fact that Maryland still has an anti-adultery statute in place—punishable 
by a mere $10 maximum fine—and adultery is therefore technically illegal in that 
state, the Maryland court stated that it still would not find an act of adultery to be 
enough to justify a denial of retirement benefits.66 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the following section, some courts have found acts 
of adultery, whether criminalized by statute or not, are enough to justify sanctions by 
public employers of their employees. 
C. Present Day Privacy Issues: The Circuit Split on Sanctions of Public 
Employees for Legal Off-Duty Conduct 
1. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City: The Tenth Circuit held the constitutional 
right to privacy is “not fundamental” 
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit grappled with the issue of sexual privacy in the case 
Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City.67 The case involved a female police officer, Sharon 
Johnson, who was formally reprimanded for having a brief affair with a male officer 
(who was not a member of her department), whom she met at an out-of-town 
conference.68 At the time of the affair, Johnson was separated from her husband and 
had initiated divorce proceedings.69 Johnson had also obtained a protective order 
against her husband, which he violated when he threatened to kill both himself and 
her.70 
Johnson’s reprimand stated that she had allowed “her personal life [to] interfere 
with her duties as an officer by having sexual relations with an officer from 
Washington County while attending a training session out of town which was paid for 
in part by LaVerkin City” and advised her to “avoid the appearance of impropriety” 
and to “take care to conduct [herself] in the future in a manner that will be consistent 
with the city policies and the police department policies.”71 The reprimand went on to 
state that “[f]urther violations will lead to additional discipline up to and including 
termination.”72 
 
65 Id. at 658 (quoting Employees' Ret. Sys. of Baltimore Cnty. v. Brown, 973 A.2d. 879, 893 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009)) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
66 Id. at 658–59. 
67 528 F.3d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2008). 
68 Id. at 764. 
69 Id. at 764–65. 
70 Id. at 765. 
71 Id. at 766. 
72 Id. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss4/6
2020] PRIVATE AFFAIRS 823 
Johnson was also falsely accused by her husband of having an affair with the Chief 
of Police, Kim Seegmiller, which resulted in a temporary suspension for both Johnson 
and Seegmiller.73 The City Council launched a confidential investigation into the 
matter, but the story was leaked and printed on the front page of the local newspaper.74 
Stories of the investigation “also appeared in other newspapers, and were broadcast 
on radio and television stations throughout the state of Utah.”75 Although the 
investigation ultimately failed to substantiate the allegation, both Johnson and 
Seegmiller’s reputations were irreparably harmed.76 Furthermore, Johnson was asked 
to step down from her position on the county SWAT team.77 While Johnson was 
eventually reinstated as a police officer with the city, she was not reinstated to the 
SWAT team because the city refused to submit to the county a required letter of good 
standing on her behalf.78 With her career, reputation, and credibility undermined and 
maligned, Johnson resigned from the police force a few months after being 
reinstated.79 In her complaint, Johnson claimed in part that “the City violated her 
constitutional rights by orally reprimanding her for private, off-duty conduct,” and the 
City violated her fundamental liberty interest “to engage in a private act of consensual 
sex.”80 The district court granted summary judgment against Johnson.81  
 
73 Id. at 764. The author concedes that in law enforcement and military contexts, the 
departments may have an interest in placing rules around relationships with co-workers and 
supervisors. However, since Johnson was in a separate department than the male officer with 
whom she had an affair, and a formal investigation the allegation that she had an affair with her 
supervisor revealed the allegation was false, that argument is not relevant to this discussion and 
will not be addressed here.  
74 Id. at 765. See also Fred Hosier, Employee’s Affair Gets Her Disciplined — Was It Fair?, 
HR MORNING (June 26, 2008), http://www.hrmorning.com/employees-affair-gets-her-
disciplined-was-it-fair/. 
75 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 765. 
76 Seegmiller’s attorney stated, “Chief Seegmiller has suffered a great loss of respect both in 
the community of La Verkin as well as statewide due to the publicity these accusations have 
generated.” Seegmiller had planned to run for sheriff in 2008, but his attorney noted, “[t]hose 
aspirations are unlikely to be successful due to the negative exposure he has received from this 
incident.” His attorney also stated, “Chief Seegmiller has suffered defamation of character, libel 
and slander by the personnel actions taken by the City Council without proper investigation as 
to the truth of the allegations. Mr. Seegmiller's family suffered extreme emotional distress as 
well. His wife has a real estate business which also suffered.” After Seegmiller was reinstated, 
he submitted his resignation. However, he ultimately remained on the job. See Nancy Perkins, 
La Verkin Chief Seeks $1 Million in Damages, DESERT NEWS (Jan. 12, 2004), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/585036751/La-Verkin-chief-seeks-1-million-in-
damages.html. 
77 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 765. 
78 Id. at 766. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 766, 770. 
81 Id. at 764. 
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On review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision because it 
determined that Johnson's asserted right “is not fundamental” and concluded that “the 
City only needed—and had—a rational basis for restricting it.”82 At the time this case 
took place, Utah still classified adultery as a class B misdemeanor, though the statute 
has since been repealed.83 No criminal charges were brought against Johnson for her 
act of adultery, however.84 In fact, the last time an adultery charge was brought before 
a Utah court was in 1928.85 
2. Coker v. Whittington: The Fifth Circuit joins the Tenth Circuit in failing 
to find a right to privacy 
In 2017, nine years after Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, the Fifth Circuit weighed in 
on the sexual privacy issue and ultimately agreed with the Tenth Circuit. This case, 
Coker v. Whittington, involved two male sheriff’s deputies who moved in with each 
other’s wives.86 The deputies were placed on administrative leave and each was 
ordered to “cease living with a woman not his spouse,” and if they did not comply by 
 
82 Id. at 772. 
83 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (repealed).  
84 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 772. 
85 See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 772 n.22 (Utah 2006) (“The most recent adultery 
prosecution to have reached this court appears to have occurred in 1928, under a previous 
criminal provision.”) (citing State v. Lewellyn, 266 P. 261, 262 (Utah 1928)). In the Lewellyn 
case, it was, surprisingly, not the woman who was prosecuted. A husband suspected his wife of 
having an affair and hired a private detective. When the detective saw the wife enter into her 
home with the defendant, he called the husband who arrived with a police officer. The defendant 
was then placed under arrest. Although the wife was not arrested, she stated that if the defendant 
was going to jail then she was going to jail too. She insisted on sitting in the front seat of the 
police car with the defendant and “leaned over and kissed him.” The trial court directed a verdict 
of not guilty. The issue of whether the directed verdict was proper was appealed up to the Utah 
Supreme Court which held “upon a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal the province of the 
court is to consider and determine as a matter of law whether or not there is substantial evidence 
of the guilt of accused sufficient in law to support a conviction, and, if there is, to deny the 
motion and submit the case to the jury.” Lewellyn, 266 P. at 262–63. The dissent pointed out 
that there were additional facts to the case, and the accused could not be put on trial again for 
the charged offense anyway, a point to which the state had conceded. Id. at 265 (Straup, J., 
dissenting). 
86 One might assume the individuals involved in the case were “swingers,” a descriptor for 
people who switch sexual partners. See DAVID K. BARNHART & ALLAN A. METCALF, AMERICA 
IN SO MANY WORDS: WORDS THAT HAVE SHAPED AMERICA 261 (1997). According to 
Courthouse News, the two deputies had been friends since the age of 16 and their families would 
often spend time together. In 2016, “both men fell in love with the other one’s wife.” They 
swapped spouses and “began living together as would a married couple” and planned to divorce 
and remarry. The men stated that “the entire arrangement was amicable and supported by both 
families.” Fired Wife-Swapping Deputies Sue Sheriff, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 9, 
2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/fired-wife-swapping-deputies-sue-sheriff/.  
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a specified date, their employment would be considered voluntarily terminated.87 
Even if they did comply with the order, they still “would be demoted and sent to work 
at the Sheriff’s detention and correctional centers at a reduced rate of pay. The 
demotion would result in a loss of pay and prestige.”88 The deputies did not comply 
and were subsequently terminated, at which time they filed a lawsuit against the 
sheriff, the deputy sheriff, and the Bossier Parish Sheriff's Office.89  
The district court did not find the terminations to be unconstitutional.90 In a brief 
opinion that spanned less than three full pages, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision, noting that even if the relationships were in fact “consensual and 
loving . . . sexual decisions between consenting adults take on a different color when 
the adults are law enforcement officers.”91 This case took place in Louisiana, where 
adultery is not criminalized.92 
3. Perez v. City of Roseville: The Ninth Circuit recognizes the right to 
privacy 
In early 2018, the Ninth Circuit broke with the Fifth and Tenth Circuits on the 
issue of sexual privacy as it relates to law enforcement officers. In Perez v. City of 
Roseville, a former probationary police officer, Janelle Perez, was terminated after an 
Internal Affairs investigation discovered her sexual relationship with a fellow police 
officer from her department, Shad Begley.93 At the time of the affair, both Perez and 
Begley were separated from but still married to other individuals.94 Although the 
Internal Affairs investigation found no evidence of on-duty sexual contact between 
the two officers,95 Perez (but not Begley) was terminated.96 Perez argued in part that 
her termination “violated her constitutional rights to privacy and intimate association 
because it was impermissibly based in part on disapproval of her private, off-duty 
 
87 Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2017). 
88 Fired Wife-Swapping Deputies Sue Sheriff, supra note 86. 
89 Coker, 858 F.3d at 306.   
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 306–07 (emphasis added). 
92 See La. Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. Connick, 902 So. 2d 1090, 1098 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005) (upholding the trial court’s decision to strike portions of La. R.S. § 14:89 (crime 
against nature) that criminalized sodomy and stating “uncompensated sexual behavior between 
consenting adult humans under La.R.S. 14:89(A)(1) is no longer proscribed; therefore, it is not 
unlawful.”). 
93 Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2018). 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 848–49. 
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sexual conduct.”97 Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.98  
However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that there was enough evidence for 
Perez to survive summary judgment, noting they “have long recognized that officers 
and employees of a police department enjoy a right of privacy in ‘private, off-duty’ 
sexual behavior.”99 Under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, “the Constitution is violated 
when a public employee is terminated (a) at least in part on the basis of (b) protected 
conduct, such as her private, off-duty sexual activity.”100 The court also stated that the 
decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits “fail to appreciate the impact of Lawrence v. 
Texas on the jurisprudence of the constitutional right to sexual autonomy.”101 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held on that issue that “the Constitution forbids the 
Department from expressing its moral disapproval of Perez's extramarital affair by 
terminating her employment on that basis.”102 This case took place in California, 
which does not criminalize adultery. 
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEXUAL PRIVACY 
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach in Lawrence v. Texas Expanded the Right 
to Privacy 
As explained in Part II, citizens of the United States are protected by a right to 
privacy under the Constitution. This right to privacy has evolved over time and 
includes the right to sexual privacy. Specifically, public employees have a 
constitutional right to sexual privacy for legal sexual conduct between consenting 
adults occurring during off-duty hours. This argument is rooted in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has held in a litany of 
cases, including Lawrence v. Texas.103 In Lawrence, private citizens engaged in 
private, consensual sexual activity, and criminal charges were brought against them 
based on statutes that criminalized sexual activity between people of the same sex.104 
While the Lawrence Court did not explicitly state a right to sexual privacy, in 
overturning Bowers and declaring anti-sodomy statutes unconstitutional, it did 
 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 850. 
99 Id. at 851. See also Thorne v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d at 468, 471 (9th Cir. 1983); Fugate v. 
Phx. Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 1986). 
100 Perez, 882 F.3d at 851. 
101 Id. at 856 (internal citation omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
104 See id. at 563. 
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strongly emphasize “the importance of autonomy and privacy in making personal 
choices around relationships, family, and sexuality.”105 
The cases in the circuit split involve public employees sanctioned and/or fired by 
their employers for legal sexual conduct, though there were no criminal charges. In 
two cases with indistinguishable material facts, Seegmiller and Perez, the courts came 
to opposite conclusions. This injustice resulted in two police officers, who engaged in 
the same behavior, being treated in vastly differing ways. One officer received a 
reprimand, sanctions, and harsh consequences while the other was protected by her 
right to privacy.  
The solution to this discrepancy is for the Supreme Court to formally extend the 
right to privacy to private, consensual sexual activity because this right arguably 
already exists within the Constitution. The right to privacy has evolved since it was 
first established in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut, which extended privacy to the 
use of contraception by heterosexual married individuals.106 Seven years later, in 
1972, Eisenstadt expanded the rights to individuals regardless of their marital 
status.107 The following year, the landmark Roe v. Wade decision expanded women’s 
privacy rights from having the right to prevent pregnancy to having a right to terminate 
a pregnancy.108 Privacy rights took a step backwards in 1986 when the Supreme Court 
declined to extend the right to privacy to same-sex sexual relationships in Bowers; 
however, the Court realized the error of this ruling and corrected it in Lawrence, where 
it held that anti-sodomy statutes are unconstitutional.109 The right to privacy should 
be extended to all individuals regardless of marital status, sexual orientation, 
occupation, or any other defining factor because the government simply has no place 
in the bedrooms of its citizens. 
B. Adultery Statutes in Eighteen States are Unconstitutional because they 
Violate the Constitutional Right to Privacy 
In both Coker v. Whittington and Perez v. City of Roseville, anti-adultery statutes 
are not at issue because Louisiana and California, respectively, do not criminalize 
adultery. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City occurred in Utah where adultery was 
criminalized at the time the case took place, but Utah has since repealed the statute.110 
The court’s analysis did not depend on the existence of the anti-adultery statute, 
however. In fact, the issue of Utah’s existing anti-adultery statute was never raised. 
Therefore, it is possible to resolve the current split without ruling on anti-adultery 
statutes. Nevertheless, the anti-adultery laws that remain in eighteen states are 
 
105 See Jota Borgmann, Hunting Expeditions: Perverting Substantive Due Process and 
Undermining Sexual Privacy in the Pursuit of Moral Trophy Game, 15 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 
171, 187 (2006) (emphasis added). 
106 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
107 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
108 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
109 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
110 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (repealed). 
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unconstitutional because they violate the constitutional right to privacy and conflict 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas. 
In states where adultery is still criminalized, it is not difficult to foresee arguments 
arising over the existence of an anti-adultery statute; public employers could argue 
that because an anti-adultery statute exists, committing adultery would be a fireable 
offense given the “criminal” status of such behavior. Since anti-adultery statutes are 
unconstitutional at their core, eliminating them will avoid any confusion in cases 
taking place in jurisdictions with anti-adultery statutes still on the books.  
Anti-adultery statutes are plainly unconstitutional, similar to the way in which anti-
sodomy statutes are unconstitutional. In finding the anti-sodomy statutes 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court noted the infrequency with which the anti-
sodomy statutes were enforced, stating, “In all events that infrequency makes it 
difficult to say that society approved of a rigorous and systematic punishment of the 
consensual acts committed in private and by adults.”111 The anti-adultery statutes are 
similarly situated in that adultery charges are rarely prosecuted in today’s society.112 
However, the threat of enforcement is nevertheless ever-present and cannot be 
ignored.113 Furthermore, adultery is similarly a private act committed by consenting 
adults. Lawrence made clear that the government has no business controlling the way 
in which adults choose to have private consensual sex. It is not a far stretch to extend 
that logic to say that the government also should not be involved in with whom adults 
engage in private consensual sex. 
The majority’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas was grounded in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.114 Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion, 
chose to look to the Equal Protection clause in support of the argument to overturn 
anti-sodomy statutes, stating, “We have been most likely to apply rational basis review 
to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause where, as here, the 
challenged legislation inhibits personal relationships.”115 Anti-adultery statutes 
similarly inhibit personal relationships. Furthermore, in her concurring opinion, 
Justice O’Connor points out,  
Moral disapproval . . . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis 
review under the Equal Protection Clause . . . Indeed, we have never held that 
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient 
 
111 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569–70. 
112 Ethan Bronner, Mass. Among 23 States Where Adultery Is a Crime, But Rarely 
Prosecuted, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 15, 2012), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/11/15/adultery-still-crime-states-including-
mass/KiIPGRcFnAeT4CGmenFTKM/story.html. 
113 For example, in 2004, John Bushey, a sixty-six-year-old Virginia attorney, was charged 
with adultery, a misdemeanor under Virginia’s anti-adultery statute. Bushey, who had been 
married for eighteen years, had an affair with another woman, Nellie Mae Hensley. When 
Bushey ended the affair, Hensley sought revenge by reporting him to the police. Bushey 
ultimately pled guilty and was sentenced to 20 days of community service. See Turley, supra 
note 46, at B1. 
114 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
115 Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates 
among groups of persons.116  
As discussed earlier in this Note, adultery, too, is behavior often viewed with moral 
disapproval. The state has no real interest in criminalizing adultery, and those who 
engage in such activity are likely to do so regardless of the existence of laws 
proscribing it. Furthermore, because evidence has shown that the criminalization of 
adultery is “overwhelmingly directed against women and girls,” the laws are clearly 
discriminatory to women.117 Whether one looks to the Due Process Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause, it is clear that anti-adultery statutes violate the U.S. 
Constitution.  
C. Public Employees Have a Constitutional Right to Sexual Privacy 
The petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas were adults and “their conduct was in private 
and consensual.”118 Similarly, the petitioners in Seegmiller, Coker, and Perez were all 
adults engaging in private and consensual conduct.119 The question in Lawrence was 
whether the petitioners were “free to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of 
their liberty,” and the Court addressed this issue by looking to the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.120 The Court looked at past 
decisions illustrating “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex.”121  
The Court concluded its opinion by stating, “As the Constitution endures, persons 
in every generation can invoke [Due Process] principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.”122 The next generation of cases is before us in the circuit split concerning 
public employees.  
D. Analyzing the Logic of the Circuit Split Opinions 
The Tenth Circuit rationalized in Seegmiller that the right to private sexual contact 
found in Lawrence is not a fundamental right nor a liberty interest and the Supreme 
Court did not announce it or categorize it as such.123 The Seegmiller opinion states, 
 
116 Id. at 582. (internal citations omitted). 
117 See United Nations Working Group, supra note 53, at 1.  
118 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
119 See generally Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 848 (9th Cir. 2018); Coker v. 
Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2017); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 
765 (10th Cir. 2008).  
120 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
121 Id. at 572. 
122 Id. at 579. 
123 Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771. 
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“Broadly speaking, no one disputes a right to be free from government interference in 
matters of consensual sexual privacy.”124 Yet the court’s very next sentence begins 
with a qualification: “But . . . a plaintiff asserting a substantive due process right must 
both (1) carefully describe the right and its scope; and (2) show how the right as 
described fits within the Constitution's notions of ordered liberty.”125 The court 
concluded that Johnson’s right to privacy was not a fundamental right.126 The court's 
rationalization for this conclusion was that Johnson did not point to “historical 
anecdotes” and instead relied on the fact that the defendants did not dispute that her 
asserted interest was a fundamental right.127  
As history has shown, this argument is not persuasive. In 1986, the Supreme Court 
stated in Bowers v. Hardwick, “It is obvious to us that neither [of the defendant’s 
arguments] would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of 
consensual sodomy. Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.”128 
Looking back on this opinion now, we can clearly see the flaws with this argument, 
and, as evidenced by the Lawrence v. Texas decision in 2003, the Supreme Court was 
able to see them as well. While Ms. Johnson may not have established her right to 
sexual privacy as fundamental, it is not so far outside the realm of possibility to 
imagine that she could. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit erred in this case when it failed 
to properly apply the holding in Lawrence v. Texas.129  
The argument in Coker is unpersuasive as well. In an opinion spanning less than 
three full pages, the Fifth Circuit looked to the district court’s decision, which stated, 
“There are no decisions to the contrary suggesting that the deputies, as public 
employees of law enforcement agencies, have constitutional rights to ‘associate’ with 
each other's spouses before formal divorce.”130 The court found “no reversible error 
of fact or law in the district court's decision.”131 The issue, however, is not whether 
the deputies have a constitutional right to associate with each other’s spouses; the 
question the court should have asked is whether the deputies have a constitutional right 
to privacy. Had the court asked the correct question and properly applied the precedent 
set by Lawrence v. Texas, then the answer is clear: the deputies have a constitutional 
right to privacy. 
 
124 Id. at 769. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 770. 
127 Id. 
128 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). 
129 See Connor, supra note 38, at 507. In this note, Connor analyzes the Seegmiller opinion 
and arrives at the same conclusion: “The Tenth Circuit failed to apply the reasoning from 
Lawrence in the case of Seegmiller.” Id. However, Connor concludes that “[t]here should not 
be a declaration of a broad fundamental right to privacy because it would hinder the 
government’s ability to protect the public.” Id. at 521. 
130 Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2017). 
131 Id. 
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The court acknowledged Lawrence only insofar as to say that the Lawrence 
decision does not mandate a change to public employee policies.132 The petitioners in 
Lawrence were not public employees, so there was no reason for the Supreme Court 
to consider that aspect in its opinion. While Lawrence does not mandate a change to 
public employee policies, that does not mean that a change to public employees is 
unnecessary or unwarranted. Furthermore, since the Constitution extends greater 
protection to public employees, the court should have factored those considerations 
into its decision. In its brief opinion, the court also projected that there might be a 
possibility of the plaintiffs’ activities eventually having an adverse impact on their 
jobs.133 However, the police department produced no proof of any adverse impact on 
job performance.134 
The Ninth Circuit in Perez v. Johnson, on the other hand, examined this issue in 
greater depth and concluded that Perez’s extramarital sexual conduct was protected by 
“her rights to privacy and intimate association.”135 Perez relied on an earlier decision 
from 1983, Thorne v. El Segundo, in which the Ninth Circuit “first recognized that 
police officers enjoy a ‘right of privacy in “private, off-duty” sexual behavior.’”136 
The Perez opinion pointed to the fact that there was no evidence that Perez's affair had 
any meaningful effect upon her job performance, nor any evidence of inappropriate 
behavior occurring while she was on duty.137 Furthermore, it was “undisputed that 
Perez's productivity was ‘average to above-average’” and there was not “any 
contention that [her] sexual conduct violated any narrowly drawn, constitutionally 
permissible regulation.”138 
The Perez decision noted that the Ninth Circuit was in tension with the Fifth and 
Tenth Circuits. It rejected the approach taken by those circuits not only because it was 
bound by the precedent set in Thorne, but also because those circuits had failed to 
appreciate the impact the Lawrence decision had “on the jurisprudence of the 
constitutional right to sexual autonomy.”139 The Perez opinion stated that Lawrence 
did more than overturn anti-sodomy statutes as unconstitutional; “it recognized that 
 
132 Id. (“That Lawrence v. Texas… expanded substantive constitutional rights relating to 
personal sexual choices does not mandate a change in policies relevant to public employment, 
where it was more recently reaffirmed that public employees necessarily shed some of their 
constitutional rights as a legitimate exchange for the privilege of their positions.”) (citing 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006)). The Garcetti case to which the court refers, 
however, is wholly unrelated to issues of privacy, sexual or otherwise.  
133 Id. at 307 (“Finally, it is not hard to envision how the existence of Coker's and Golden's 
cohabitation with each other's wives prior to divorce and remarriage might be adversely used in 
litigation concerning the deputies' official conduct.” (emphasis added)).  
134 See id. at 304; Coker v. Whittington, 169 F. Supp. 3d 677 (W.D. La. 2016). 
135 Perez v. City of Roseville, 882 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir. 2018). 
136 Id. (citing Fugate v. Phx. Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing Thorne 
v. El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
137 Id. at 854–55.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 855–56.  
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intimate sexual conduct represents an aspect of the substantive liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause.”140 Perez further stated, 
Lawrence makes clear that the State may not stigmatize private sexual 
conduct simply because the majority has “traditionally viewed a particular 
practice,” such as extramarital sex, “as immoral.” Thus, without a showing 
of adverse job impact or violation of a narrow, constitutionally valid 
departmental rule, the Constitution forbids the Department from expressing 
its moral disapproval of Perez's extramarital affair by terminating her 
employment on that basis.141 
Ultimately, the Perez opinion is the strongest opinion in this trilogy, as it is the 
most in line with the Supreme Court’s directive in Lawrence v. Texas. While the Ninth 
Circuit properly applied the precedent set by Lawrence, the Tenth and Fifth Circuits 
failed to apply the precedent to Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City and Coker v. Whittington, 
respectively.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The right to privacy has been evolving ever since it was first established in 1965. 
It should and likely will continue to evolve and expand. Per the Supreme Court, the 
government may not control the private, consensual bedroom activities of any person 
regardless of their marital status, gender, or sexual orientation. This protection extends 
to public employees, whose right to sexual privacy does not end by virtue of their 
public employment. When it comes to matters of criminal activity, public employees 
should, in fact, be held to a higher standard. Committing a crime is wrong regardless 
of one’s status in society, but in cases of public employees engaging in corrupt or 
criminal activity, there is not only a wrong, but also a violation of trust. For instance, 
the public should be able to trust that law enforcement officers will do the right thing 
in the course of their duty to protect the public and that they will not use their position 
to abuse their powers.  
However, when it comes to legal, off-duty activity, public employees have a right 
to privacy. Especially in states where adultery is not illegal, the government cannot 
sanction public employees for their private sexual conduct. In these cases, no crimes 
were committed. When public employees engage in legal and consensual activity that 
occurs outside of working hours and has no effect on their job performance, this 
conduct is their own private business, and they are constitutionally protected by a right 
to privacy. Public employers may not reprimand, sanction, or fire employees for this 
activity because public employees engaging in private, consensual, and otherwise 
legal sexual activities during off-duty hours are protected by the Constitution, and any 
punishment for this behavior violates their constitutional rights.  
Furthermore, anti-adultery statutes further intrude upon the right to sexual privacy; 
these statutes are antiquated, inappropriate in today’s modern society, and, ultimately, 
unconstitutional. As such, all remaining anti-adultery statutes should be uniformly 
repealed or held unconstitutional.  
 
140 Id. at 856 (emphasis added). 
141 Id. (citation omitted).  
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The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split on whether public employees 
may be punished for off-duty sexual conduct by taking the rationale it applied in 
Lawrence v. Texas one step further and explicitly and definitively stating that there is 
a fundamental right to sexual privacy. 
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